issues in civil procedure jurisprudence are more significant than pleading standards, which are the key that opens access to courts." 3 As a result, the decision has been the subject of significant debate.
In Twombly, the Court offered a potentially revolutionary gloss on traditional notice pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The decision on its face purports to do nothing more than interpret the plain language of Rule 8(a). Nonetheless, in doing so, the Court articulates a standard that requires more searching scrutiny of the pleadings, which now must not merely put a defendant on "notice" of the claims against it, but must state those claims in a manner that demonstrates that plaintiffs' entitlement to relief is "plausible". 4 This plausibility standard has been the focus of intense scrutiny. Some members of the academy and judiciary already have sought to limit the scope of the Court's decision and its new standard, claiming that it is "vague," "less than pellucid," or has caused "significant uncertainty." 5 A careful reading of the Court's decision, however, demonstrates that this angst is largely unwarranted. The majority in Twombly undertook a careful analysis based on the text and purpose of the Federal Rules, articulating a standard that is relatively clear. The Court has made plain that, in its opinion, the Federal Rules always required that at a minimum plaintiffs must state a claim that is logically coherent-i.e., the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint must be both necessary and sufficient to establish defendant's liability. This Article maintains that this logical coherence requirement is largely the aim of the Court's plausibility standard, that the Court correctly held that this requirement was mandated by the Federal Rules, and that it is seventy-year-old liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) has been decidedly tightened (if not discarded) in favor of a stricter standard requiring the pleading of facts painting a 'plausible' picture of liability."); Linda S. Mullenix, Troubling Twombly, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 2007, at 13 (Twombly is "a surprising departure from ingrained federal pleading rules."). PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW indeed, as the majority observed, an appropriate and necessary standardparticularly in light of the increasing costs associated with defending a claim in the federal courts.
Part I of this Article discusses the various opinions issued in Twombly. 6 The majority opinion contained a careful analysis of the text and policy underlying Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding that, while the rules establish a system of "notice pleading," they do not contemplate that plaintiffs may pursue claims that are entirely speculative or that merely "possibly" entitle them to relief. 7 Rather, they require that plaintiffs demonstrate that their claims are "plausible," which flows from Rule 8(a)'s requirement that plaintiffs make a "showing" that they are entitled to relief The majority rejected any assertion that it was imposing new or heightened pleading requirements. 9 Rather, it made clear its belief that these requirements were consistent with the text and intent of the Federal Rules. 10 Part II discusses limitations of the Court's decision suggested to date." Some commentators and judges have suggested that Twombly may be limited to the antitrust context, to complex cases, or by prior or subsequent precedent.1 2 None of these purported limitations finds support in the Court's decision, however.' 3 Rather, the Court made plain that its ruling was dictated by the text of the Federal Rules, which do not manifest any limitations aimed at particular categories of cases.' 4 Nor did the Court suggest any such limitations either in the body of its opinion or in subsequent rulings.' 5 In fact, the Court specifically rejected many of the same arguments in its decision.' 6 Accordingly, the judicial (albeit early) consensus is that no such limitations exist.
Part III discusses the proper interpretation of the Twombly decision. 7 While some courts and commentators have suggested that the Court's "plausibility" standard is less than clear, a careful reading of the Court's decision demonstrates that its meaning is plain. 18 The Court sought to articulate a requirement it believed was firmly rooted in the text of the rules-that the allegations in a plaintiff's complaint must be logically coherent in the sense that, if accepted as true, they are necessary and sufficient to establish a cause of action.' 9 Pleadings that do not allege the necessary elements of a cause of action by definition do not meet the requirement under Rule 8(a) that a plaintiff demonstrate entitlement to legal relief. 2° As the Court made clear, the mere "possibility" that a plaintiff may be entitled to relief is not enough. 2 The allegations must assert a logically coherent theory that, if accepted as true, would entitle plaintiff to relief. 22 This interpretation of the rules is fully justified. It is consistent with their language as well as what we know about the drafters' intent. 3 Part IV addresses Twombly in the context of other recent Supreme Court pleading decisions as well as the changing landscape of civil litigation under the Federal Rules. 24 The Court has made clear in a variety of contexts that judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage is critical in modem litigation. 25 It has issued several recent rulings in the securities context, for example, that have imposed stringent requirements for stating a claim under the federal securities laws. 6 In doing so, the Court has noted the congressional desire to curb out-of-control litigation practices as well as the increasing costs of defending claims in the federal system. 27 These increasing costs and the broad scope of modem discovery must be counterbalanced by appropriately stringent scrutiny of the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs' claims early in the litigation.
28 This is the context in which Twombly was decided. To properly interpret the case, one must view it within the broader context of the Court's decisions regarding threshold pleading requirements as well as the evolution of civil practice under the Federal Rules. 29 Finally, Part V discusses the potential criticisms of the Twombly decision. 30 Once Twombly is properly understood as imposing a logical coherence requirement on the initial pleadings, many of the objections 18 Not only is the Court's decision plainly justified under the rules, but it also is desirable from a policy perspective. As the costs of litigation increase and the scope of discovery expands, the need for more stringent pleading standards increases. It is neither efficient nor fair to allow claims of dubious merit to proceed when doing so may lead to settlements that are not based on the underlying merits, but rather the potential costs associated with defending a lawsuit in our modem civil justice system. Twombly thus presents a welcome clarification of modem pleading standards that is likely to increase the efficiency and fairness of civil proceedings.
I. THE TWOMBLY OPINIONS
In Twombly, the parties asked the Supreme Court to address the pleading standards under the Federal Rules in the context of an antitrust conspiracy claim. 33 Specifically, consumers brought a purported class action against a variety of local telephone carriers alleging that they had engaged in a conspiracy in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.
34
Plaintiffs alleged that this conspiracy was designed to hinder the entry of rival firms in the local telephone and Internet service markets and thereby restrain competition. 35 In addition, they alleged that the defendants entered into agreements to avoid competing against one another.
3 6 As a result, they maintained, consumers of these services were forced to pay higher rates than they would have if defendants had not taken such actions. 7 The defendants were companies created as a result of the 1984 break-up of AT&T, which established a system of regional monopolies that provided local telephone service in conjunction with a competitive market for longdistance service from which these local monopolies were excluded. 38 In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress subsequently prohibited this monopoly status and authorized these local carriers to enter the longdistance market, restructuring the industry in an attempt to facilitate competition. 3 9 Nonetheless, plaintiffs alleged that these companies' anticompetitive conduct persisted, harming consumers through increased fees for telephone and Internet services. 40 The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, concluding that they had alleged only parallel business conduct and not the agreement to restrain trade necessary to state a cause of action under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 41 In so ruling, it emphasized that plaintiffs had failed to allege facts that would "exclude independent self-interested conduct as an explanation for defendants' parallel behavior." ' 42 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that the allegations supporting parallel action were sufficient to state a claim because defendants failed to show that there was "no set of facts" under which plaintiffs could demonstrate that the parallelism alleged in the complaint was the result of collusion among the defendants rather than coincidence. 43 The appellate court specifically ruled that "plus factors" that would exclude independent self-interest as a motivation for parallel conduct "are not required to be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to survive dismissal." 44 Defendants filed a petition for certiorari asking the Supreme Court to resolve this dispute regarding the appropriate standard under Federal Rule of 37 The majority's decision contains a thorough and thoughtful analysis of both the text and underlying policy rationale behind the Federal Rules and traditional notice pleading standards. In the process, the Court articulated a strong vision of the judicial role in assessing the legal sufficiency of the pleadings early in the litigation, one that will likely have a sweeping effect on civil litigation in the federal system.
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority made clear that the issue before it was a simple one. It observed that under the Sherman Act, "'[t]he crucial question' is whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct 'stem[s] from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express."' 5 "Even 'conscious parallelism,' a common reaction of 'firms in a concentrated market [that] (1993)).
defendants that was designed to restrain trade. "Unilateral" conduct was not sufficient to demonstrate an antitrust conspiracy. 2 The question before the Court was whether the plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently pleaded this element. The majority began its analysis by repeating the standard characterization of Rule 8(a) as establishing a system of "notice pleading": The rule, the majority observed, "requires only 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."' 5 3 Under this standard, a plaintiff need not make "detailed factual allegations. 54 However, a plaintiff cannot merely rest on "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." 55 Rule 8(a) requires that a plaintiff provide "grounds" for the plaintiff's alleged "entitle[ment] to relief. ' Having articulated these general principles, the Court proceeded to elaborate on the traditional notice pleading requirements. It held that in pleading a claim, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that its claim is "plausible." ' 58 The majority distinguished this standard from a "probability" standard, which would impose a higher burden on plaintiffs. 59 A plaintiff was not required to allege facts that demonstrate a "probability" that it was entitled to relief; rather, it was merely required to provide a showing that its claim was "plausible." 60 Nor could a judge dismiss a plaintiffs complaint based on his or her experienced belief that plaintiffs ability to recover was "remote and unlikely.", 6 ' Rather, the inquiry must focus on the sufficiency of the pleadings and whether on their face they state a valid claim. Nonetheless, the majority's decision made clear that plaintiffs had to include allegations in their complaint suggesting that they were entitled to relief. 62 It was not sufficient for a plaintiff to plead allegations that were merely consistent with a defendant's liability. 63 Such allegations could also be consistent with the defendant being found not liable. The plausibility standard, the Court underscored, was designed to ensure that plaintiffs cross this threshold from equanimity between liability and non-liability to a set of allegations that were sufficient if taken as true to establish liability. 64 In articulating this test, the majority focused heavily on the text of Rule 8(a). 65 In particular, it noted the rule's requirement that a plaintiff provide "not only 'fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also 'grounds' on which the claim rests., 66 "The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the 'plain statement' possess enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief."' ' 67 The Court thus "retire[d]" the "famous observation" in Conley v. Gibson that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief., 68 The majority reasoned that "[t]he phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint. '69 According to the majority, the problem with the overlyliteral reading of Conley that plaintiffs urged and which some courts had adopted was that "a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some 'set of [undisclosed] recovery." 7° As a result, the Court noted that numerous courts had already rejected "taking the literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard."'" Rather, according to the Court, they had followed something akin to the plausibility standard. At the same time, the majority expressly stated that it was not applying a "heightened" pleading standard such as that for pleading fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9. 72 As the majority observed, imposing such a requirement was beyond the purview of the courts. 73 Rather, it could "only be accomplished 'by the process of amending the Federal Rules."' ' 74 As the majority explained, "[h]ere, our concern is not that the allegations in the complaint were insufficiently 'particular[ized]', rather, the complaint warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs' entitlement to relief plausible., 75 Thus, according to the majority, the plausibility test flows directly from the text and does not impose a new pleading standard.
The Argument From Precedent
The Court also maintained that its interpretation of Rule 8(a) was consistent with prior precedent. In particular, the Court observed that in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 76 it had previously held that "something beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with 'a largely groundless claim' be allowed to 'take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.' ' 7 7 Thus, the majority maintained that it had previously made clear that allegations that merely established the "possibility" of relief were insufficient under Rule 8(a). While it may not have fully articulated the standard necessary to satisfy the Rule 8(a) requirement in prior decisions such as Dura Pharmaceuticals, at a minimum the Court had previously established what was not sufficient. The plausibility standard described by the Court supplied this missing link, establishing the threshold standard that must be met in order to state a legally sufficient claim under Rule 8. 
Underlying Policy Concerns
Finally, the Court also noted the important policy implications of its ruling. There is a basic tradeoff that must be made between the level of scrutiny applied at the pleading stage and the costs associated with continuing litigation. The Court reiterated the important function that judicial scrutiny of the pleadings serves in the federal system. " [W] hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, 'this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.,, 78 Thus, judicial scrutiny of the pleadings plays an important role in the efficient conduct of civil litigation.
In particular, the majority appeared concerned that discovery costs were only increasing for parties engaged in modem complex civil cases. It noted specifically that "antitrust discovery can be expensive," observing by way of example that Twombly was a putative class action brought on behalf of millions of subscribers to local telephone and Internet services against major telecommunications firms for conduct that occurred over a period of seven years. 79 Thus, the potential for costly discovery in Twombly was significant. More generally, the Court expressed a concern that discovery costs were only increasing and that lawsuits were being settled based on their in terrorem value rather than the actual merits of the case.
Application of the Plausibility Standard
Applying its newly-articulated standard, the Court found that plaintiffs' complaint was deficient. 80 Plaintiffs had alleged that defendants engaged in parallel conduct, but had failed to allege in anything other than a conclusory manner that defendants entered into an agreement to restrain trade. 81 (2)). The Court noted that complaint did contain "a few stray statements speak[ing] directly of agreement," the majority concluded that these were "merely legal conclusions resting on the prior allegations. ' 3 As the Court reiterated, "[t]he need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the 'plain statement' possess enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ' ' 4 Thus, the Court concluded, the complaint failed to meet the requirements of Rule 8 because it did not include a critical element that plaintiffs needed to demonstrate to establish their claim. As the majority observed, the allegations in the complaint were fully consistent with conduct constituting "the natural, unilateral reaction of each [incumbent local exchange carriers] intent on keeping its regional dominance." 85
B. The Twombly Dissent
While achieving a broad consensus, the Twombly decision was not unanimous.
The two dissenting members of the Court rejected the majority's textual analysis, suggesting that it constituted a sweeping rewriting of the Federal Rules. 86 In addition, they suggested that stringent standards for reviewing the sufficiency of the pleadings were not particularly necessary given that, in their view, there were other mechanisms available under the Federal Rules for controlling unwarranted litigation costs and dealing with claims that had little or no merit. 8 7
Textual Analysis
The dissenters focused heavily on the notice aspect of the modem federal pleading rules. They maintained that Rule 8(a)(2) was designed simply to provide the other side with notice of the claims against it. As "when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § I claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action." Id.
83. Id. at 1970. 84. Id. at 1966 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "A statement of parallel conduct, even conduct consciously undertaken, needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § I claim; without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a defendant's commercial efforts stays in neutral territory." Id. hat the Court has announced a significant new rule that does not even purport to respond to any congressional command is glaringly obvious."); id. at 1989 (characterizing majority's decision as a "stark break from precedent" and stating that it "marks a fundamental-and unjustified-change in the character of pretrial practice").
87. See id. at 1987 n.13.
[Vol. In support of this conclusion, the dissent discussed at length the evolution of the Federal Rules, noting that the modem rules emerged as a rejection of prior approaches to pleading, which required the pleading of specific facts.
89
According to Justice Stevens, the drafters of Rule 8 "intentionally avoided any reference to 'facts' or 'evidence' or 'conclusions,"' specifically because they were rejecting the prior fact pleading requirements. " "Under the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal Rules, the idea was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in. The merits of a claim would be sorted out during a flexible pretrial process and, as appropriate, through the crucible of trial.'
The dissenters gave short shrift to Rule 8's requirement of a "showing," relegating their discussion of this requirement, which was the lynchpin of the majority decision, to a footnote. 92 While they acknowledged that the rule did in fact require such a showing, they maintained that whether this language "requires allegations of fact will depend on the particulars of the claim." 93 The dissent explained that the plausibility requirement that the majority articulated was different than the "showing" required under Rule 8 without elaborating at any length, other than suggesting that this language was designed to prohibit conclusory allegations. 94 Thus, for example, if the pleadings had simply alleged that there was an "agreement" without more, they may have run afoul of this requirement, which the dissent believed was closely tied to the requirement that the complaint provide adequate notice. 95 Nonetheless, the dissent maintained that, even under the majority's "plausibility" standard, the pleadings in Twombly were more than sufficient. 96 The dissent argued that in adopting the plausibility test, the majority had imported a standard that was more appropriately applied at the summary judgment stage.
97
It noted that the plausibility requirement had been 99 The dissent argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with prior decisions that had recognized that "a heightened production burden at the summary judgment stage does not translate into a heightened pleading burden at the complaint stage."
100
The dissenters also pointed to Form 9 of the Federal Rules, which provides a sample for pleading a negligence claim. 1 " ' The dissent maintained that that form, which is notoriously cursory, demonstrated that the drafters of the Federal Rules did not intend anything other than requiring plaintiffs to provide notice to the other side regarding the general nature of their claims.
1 0 2 Accordingly, the dissenters maintained, the majority's opinion imposed a "heightened" pleading standard at odds with the Federal Rules when read as a whole. 103
The majority rejected the dissent's suggestion that the standard it articulated was inconsistent with Form 9, finding that the allegations in the Twombly complaint were deficient in comparison with the requirements Finally, other courts have stated that "the opinion seeks to find a middle ground between 'heightened fact pleading,' which is expressly rejected.... and allowing complaints that are no more than 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action."' Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965 Ct. at , 1974 . See also Spencer, supra note 2, at 431, 474 (arguing that, after Twombly, "[n]otice pleading is dead" and that "it is hard to distinguish the Court's plausibility standard from the heightened pleading obligation of Rule 9(b)").
101. Whereas the model form alleges that the defendant struck the plaintiff with his car while plaintiff was crossing a particular highway at a specified date and time, the complaint here furnishes no clue as to which of the four [incumbent local exchange carriers] (much less which of their employees) supposedly agreed, or when and where the illicit agreement took place.'°4
Moreover, as noted above,'°5 the majority specifically disavowed any suggestion that it was imposing a "heightened" pleading standard requiring particularity in the pleading of facts such as that embodied in Rule 9. Rather, the majority maintained that it was simply interpreting Rule 8 according to its plain language and, moreover, that its interpretation of Rule 8 was in fact that generally accepted by the lower federal courts, which had not adhered to a literal reading of the language in the Court's decision in
Conley.

The Argument From Precedent
The dissent argued that the Conley formulation should not be so lightly rejected given its longstanding pedigree. It maintained that, "[c]onsistent with the design of the Federal Rules, Conley's 'no set of facts' formulation permits outright dismissal only when proceeding to discovery or beyond would be futile."' ' 0 6 Accordingly, the dissent claimed that the Conley language imposed only a minimal requirement that plaintiffs provide only the most general notice of their claims. In the words of Justice Stevens, "[i]t reflects a philosophy that, unlike in the days of code pleading, separating the wheat from the chaff is a task assigned to the pretrial and trial process.' '°M oreover, the dissent claimed that the lower courts had in fact relied extensively on the Conley formulation and that, accordingly, the majority's 104. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1971 n.10 (majority opinion) ("A defendant wishing to prepare an answer in the simple fact pattern laid out in Form 9 would know what to answer; a defendant seeking to respond to plaintiffs' conclusory allegations in the § 1 context would have little idea where to begin.").
105. Id. decision in Twombly represented a sea change in the pleading requirements currently applied by the federal courts.' 0 8 According to the dissent, the Conley formulation had not been the subject of longstanding criticism, but rather was an accepted description of the pleading standard embodied in Rule 8. 109 In the dissent's view, the majority's decision amounted to "rewrit[ing] the Nation's civil procedure textbooks.""
Underlying Policy Concerns
The dissent characterized the majority's decision as being based, not on the text of Rule 8, but rather on certain "practical concerns" regarding the cost of modem litigation."' It conceded that antitrust litigation could be ''enormously expensive" and that "there is a risk that jurors may mistakenly conclude that evidence of parallel conduct has proved that the parties acted pursuant to an agreement when they in fact merely made similar independent decisions." ' 12 The dissent's solution to such problems was "careful case management," which would include limitations on discovery, scrutiny of the evidence at the summary judgment stage, and "lucid instructions to juries.,113
Among the "case management" procedures the dissent cited were Rule 12(e)'s mechanism for requiring plaintiff to provide a more definite statement of the claims contained in the complaint; Rule 7(a)'s authorization for courts to require a plaintiff to reply to a defendant's answer; Rule 23's requirements for "rigorous analysis"" ' 4 of a plaintiff's class allegations to determine whether certification is appropriate; Rule 26's provisions allowing judges to control the scope and sequence of discovery to prevent 108. See id. at 1977-78. Moreover, the dissent asserted that:
Taking their cues from the federal courts, 26 States and the District of Columbia utilize as their standard for dismissal of a complaint the very language the majority repudiates: whether it appears "beyond doubt" that "no set of facts" in support of the claim would entitle the plaintiff to relief. and Rule 16's authorization of significant judicial involvement in pretrial proceedings through pretrial conferences and scheduling orders that address "the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings," "the control and scheduling of discovery," and "the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems."
In addition, the dissent cited the sanctions provisions contained in Rule 11 as a mechanism for curbing in terrorem suits." The dissent recognized the potential dangers associated with allowing plaintiffs to engage in potentially wide-ranging discovery based on the admittedly cursory allegations in their complaint. As Justice Stevens observed, "if I had been the trial judge in this case, I would not have permitted the plaintiffs to engage in massive discovery based solely on the allegations in this complaint."" ' 8 Nonetheless, Justice Stevens believed that case management provided the solution: "The potential for 'sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming' discovery... is no reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater."" 9 Here, the majority and dissent significantly departed company. The majority rejected these assertions, noting "the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been modest." 120 In doing so, it relied heavily upon an article written by Judge Easterbrook, cataloguing the numerous practical problems associated with expecting judges to manage litigation so that dubious claims do not impose unwarranted litigation costs.' 2 ' As Judge Easterbrook noted, trial judges are generally not in a position to know whether certain discovery is appropriate at the outset of the case based on the limited description of the dispute that may be provided in plaintiffs' complaint. 197, 206 (1958) Likewise, the majority rejected the dissent's proposal for limiting the costs of discovery through "phased" discovery proceedings. 27 As the Court observed, not only did such proposals suffer from the problems identified by Judge Easterbrook, but in a complex case such as Twombly, even the initial "phase" of discovery would prove "hugely time-consuming" and costly. 128 Accordingly, approaching discovery in a piecemeal fashion was unlikely to solve the problem.
Finally, the majority rejected the dissent's reliance on summary judgment procedures as providing a potential check on abusive litigation. As the majority observed, summary judgment could not serve as an effective check because the costs associated with discovery will be incurred before such proceedings can be completed and "will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases.' claims should proceed to trial or at least be resolved at the summary judgment stage, making extensive discovery a routine aspect of cases in the federal system. 130 In particular, the dissent made clear that, in its view, the fact that plaintiffs had alleged that there was an agreement among defendants was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss in Twombly. 3 ' Its approach to the evaluation of pleadings thus manifests an entirely different worldview. While the dissent argued that the majority's decision was inconsistent with the text and purpose of the Federal Rules, its opinion is filled with language indicating its objections on policy grounds. 3 2 The majority and the dissent manifested a fundamental difference of view regarding the significance of the costs associated with modem litigation in the federal system as well as the benefits of using trial to decide disputes as opposed to judicial decision making.
II. SUGGESTED LIMITATIONS ON TWOMBLY
In the wake of the potentially sweeping implications of Twombly, commentators and some judges have suggested potential limitations on the decision. However, none of these potential limitations have much, if any, support in the Court's decision. To the contrary, the majority specifically considered and expressly rejected many of these limitations. Accordingly, the early decisions applying Twombly have not adopted these proposals to artificially limit the Court's decision.
A. The Antitrust Limitation
Some commentators have suggested that Twombly should be limited to the antitrust context or that, at a minimum, its effect should not be as sweeping outside the antitrust context. discussion of the significant litigation costs associated with antitrust cases as well as its reliance on antitrust precedent arising in the summary judgment context for its articulation of the plausibility standard as evidence that the Court was concerned only with antitrust pleading standards. 1 34 Nonetheless decision relied primarily upon the text of the Federal Rules and thus cannot be limited in this manner. It was not solely a policy-driven decision, but rather a textually-based decision that had sound support in prior decisional law interpreting Rule 8. Indeed, the majority went to great lengths to repudiate this assertion, which was specifically raised by the dissent. 44 Likewise, certain courts have suggested that the degree of specificity in the complaint after Twombly "depends on context."' ' 45 Thus, "[a] simple negligence action based on an automobile accident may require little more than the allegation that the defendant negligently struck the plaintiff with his car while crossing a particular highway on a specified date and time."' ' 46 However, in more complex cases, such as the antitrust case that was the subject of the Twombly decision, more extensive factual allegations may be required.
While this interpretation may make some sense-obviously the elements that must be pled are more numerous the more complex the case, and there is a corresponding increase in the potential for logical gaps in the pleadings-nonetheless, it is an imprecise oversimplification of the Twombly approach. The Twombly majority specifically addressed the negligence
Teach Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1237-38 (2008) ("[S]
ome have suggested that perhaps one way to read the decision in Twombly is to regard it as an effort by the Court to impose heightened judicial scrutiny over pleadings but, simultaneously, to try to corral the extent of the decision's reach by pegging the need for heightened judicial scrutiny to the risk of exorbitant discovery costs.").
144 that Twombly cannot be "cabined by the costs and expenses that might accrue": "The best reading of Bell Atlantic is that the new standard is absolute, that mere notice pleading is dead for all cases and causes of action."); Spencer, supra note 2, at 457 (rejecting the assertion that Twombly "will not be applied to other cases or at least will not be applied to cases not presenting the efficiency and judicial administration concerns pointed to by the Court in Twombly").
145. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248 ("The Third Circuit has noted, and we agree, that the degree of specificity necessary to establish plausibility and fair notice, and therefore the need to include sufficient factual allegations, depends on context ....
(citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231-32)); cf Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d at 803 ("[H]ow many facts are enough will depend on the type of case. In a complex antitrust or RICO case a fuller set of factual allegations than found in the sample complaints in the civil rules' Appendix of Forms may be necessary to show that the plaintiff's claim is not 'largely groundless."' (quoting Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231-32)); Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 157-58 (Twombly "is not requiring a universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible 'plausibility standard,' which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible."), rev ' Moreover, applying different procedural rules or standards to different kinds of cases would be inconsistent with the rules' purported neutrality as well as potentially lead to unwarranted inefficiency and complexity.
150
The majority's decision makes clear that, in both the negligence and antitrust context, plaintiffs must make plausible allegations, and in both contexts the definition of plausibility is the same.' However, nothing in Swierkiewicz is at odds with the majority's analysis in Twombly. The Court in Swierkiewicz did not purport to address a situation where the plaintiff's complaint was perfectly consistent with a lack of liability. To the contrary, defendants' argument in Swierkiewicz was that the complaint was too conclusory. 162 The Court rejected that argument based on the particular allegations in the complaint, which made clear the grounds upon which the plaintiff based his assertions of discrimination, Indeed, the majority in Twombly repeatedly relied upon Swierkiewicz in its opinion.' 64 The majority did not see anything inconsistent in its ruling and the Swierkiewicz decision. Nor did it indicate that Swierkiewicz imposed any limitations on the scope of its decision. To the contrary, it rejected the arguments made by the dissenters who maintained that the two decisions were irreconcilable and that the majority was in effect overruling the Court's prior decision. 6 5 As the Court explained, "'Swierkiewicz did not change the law of pleading, but simply reemphasized.., that the Second Circuit's use of a heightened pleading standard for Title VII cases was contrary to the Federal Rules' structure of liberal pleading requirements.' 1 66
C. Limitations Imposed By Subsequent Decisions
Thus, again, the Court eschewed plaintiffs' assertion that it was requiring "heightened fact pleading of specifics," reiterating that the plausibility test was based on the plain language of Rule 8. 167 In sum, decisions such as Swierkiewicz provide no basis for imposing artificial limits on the Twombly decision. To the contrary, these and other suggested limitations were 162. Id. at 514. 163. Id. 164. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 Ct. , 1965 Ct. , 1969 Ct. , 1973 n.14 (2007) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508 n.1, 514-15). Likewise, the dissent criticized the majority's ruling as inconsistent with Swierkiewicz. See id. at 1982-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Everything today's majority says would therefore make perfect sense if it were ruling on a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment and the evidence included nothing more than the Court has described. But it should go without saying in the wake of Swierkiewicz that a heightened production burden at the summary judgment stage does not translate into a heightened pleading burden at the complaint stage.").
165. The fundamental question with which courts have begun to grapple since Twombly is the import and scope of the "plausibility" standard. 69 As noted above, some courts and commentators have argued that the standard is "vague."' 70 While such concerns are likely to dissipate with time and further judicial construction, in fact they are largely unfair. ' A careful reading of the Court's decision provides fairly clear guidelines for courts assessing whether a complaint meets the requirements of Rule 8.
A. Logical Coherence
The central theme of the plausibility standard is logical coherence. The Twombly majority emphasized that plaintiffs' complaint was deficient because it contained allegations that were fully consistent with the nonliability of the defendants. In doing so, the Court appeared to be interpreting the Federal Rules as requiring that plaintiffs' allegations contain a set of factual assertions that, if taken as true, are both necessary and sufficient to establish defendants' liability. The allegations in Twombly did not contain one necessary element-an "agreement" among the defendants to restrain trade. Accordingly, the Court found that such allegations were insufficient to state a claim. 6) standard initially so confusing is that it introduces a new 'plausibility' paradigm for evaluating the sufficiency of complaints.").
170. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 171. That is not to say that courts have not misinterpreted Twombly. For example, in EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., a divided Seventh Circuit panel stated that Twombly "appears to hold that the plaintiffs pleaded themselves out of court with detailed 'allegations of parallel conduct' that did not plausibly suggest such a conspiracy." 496 F.3d 773, 778 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1963). However, as the concurrence observed, the majority in Twombly did not dismiss plaintiffs' suit "because they pled too much detail," but rather "the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint because it did not plead enough." Id. at 783 n.l (Flaum, J., concurring) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-69 8. There can be no "showing" of liability when plaintiffs' theory is filled with logical holes or omits essential elements they must prove in order to establish defendants' liability. Nor does such an interpretation of the rules impose a requirement that plaintiffs plead facts with added specificity. The problem the Court addressed in Twombly is not one of specificity of the factual allegations, but whether plaintiffs have pleaded the necessary elements to establish liability. Requiring plaintiffs to plead each necessary element of their claims does not impose a heightened pleading standard or return us to the days of "fact pleading." Rather, it simply requires that plaintiffs include allegations in their complaint that, if believed, are not merely consistent with liability or non-liability, but rather affirmatively establish liability. In order to make the "showing" required under Rule 8, plaintiffs must demonstrate that liability is a necessary consequence of the allegations in their complaint.
The plausibility standard is also arguably dictated by the notice requirement of Rule 8.174 While the majority did not rely on this aspect of Rule 8, it further supports the majority's conclusion. A defendant cannot be put "on notice" of the claim against it if a plaintiffs complaint is riddled with logical gaps or is logically incoherent. It is only where the complaint states a logically coherent theory of liability that a defendant is truly "on notice" of the claim against it.
This analysis further undermines the dissent's objections to the plausibility standard. While the dissent relied heavily on the notice requirement of Rule 8, that requirement itself supports the plausibility standard. The dissent's suggestion that notice pleading is inconsistent with a plausibility standard is arguably based on a flawed conception of the notice requirement. Logical coherence dictates something like a plausibility requirement.
B. The Insufficiency of Conclusory Allegations
However, there is another fundamental element that the Court acknowledged in its decision-the requirement that a plaintiff state more 174 . See Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248 ("This requirement of plausibility serves not only to weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a reasonable prospect of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds of the claim against them."); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (noting that "without some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only 'fair notice,' but also the 'grounds' on which the claim rests"). than mere conclusions. 175 In one sense, conclusory allegations can be logically coherent. If, for example, the plaintiffs in Twombly simply stated that the defendants had committed "violations of the Sherman Act," that allegation would be logically coherent. On the other hand, it would not be particularly meaningful because the plaintiffs would not have stated the fundamental elements necessary to establish the alleged violations. Also, defendants would not be placed on notice regarding the facts that the plaintiffs allege establish their claim. Moreover, is it really logically coherent to simply state what amounts to a tautology-i.e., defendants are liable because they have violated the law? Can plaintiffs evade the requirement that they plead logically coherent theories by avoiding stating any of the facts that support critical elements of their claims? In this sense, such conclusory allegations fail to meet the logical coherence requirement.
Thus, there is another requirement under Twombly to state a legally sufficient claim.
176 A plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations.
177
Whether one construes this as an additional requirement or merely one aspect of logical coherence, the majority in Twombly made clear that logical coherence was plainly required under Rule 8(a), which mandates that plaintiffs make a "showing" that they are entitled to legal relief.
8
Conclusory allegations cannot constitute such a "showing." Nor do they in any real sense put the defendant on "notice" of the plaintiffs' claims.
Merely asserting liability without alleging any factual basis cannot possibly inform the defendant of the nature of plaintiffs' claims. Thus, such conclusory allegations fail under the plain language of the rule. The conceptual framework for addressing this problem is suggested in a footnote in the Twombly decision.' 79 There, the Court described three categories of allegations. 180 First, it noted that there was a line that must be drawn between "conclusory" and "factual" allegations."' Conclusory allegations are plainly insufficient to establish a claim. 82 However, as noted above, there are multiple reasons such allegations may be deemed insufficient. 83 In Twombly, the majority seemed to be suggesting that "conclusory" allegations were deficient because they could not be credited 175 as "factual" in nature. 184 Under this rubric, the logical coherence test would apply only after this threshold of pleading non-conclusory allegations was satisfied.
It is the second dividing line between the last two categories of allegations with which the Court in Twombly was primarily concerned: the distinction between "factually neutral" allegations and "factually suggestive" allegations. 85 As the Court observed, each of these dividing lines "must be crossed to enter the realm of plausible."' ' 86 The first line divided claims that were essentially legal assertions from those that were factual allegations. The factual allegation category then was subdivided into two subsets-"factually neutral" allegations and "factually suggestive" allegations.
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Only the latter were sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements under Rule 8(a). To fully understand the Twombly decision, it must be viewed in the context of the Court's other decisions regarding pleading standards. In particular, the Court has issued a number of decisions in recent years that have urged courts to apply more stringent scrutiny at the pleading stage.' 90 Twombly may be viewed largely as evidencing this broader trend, which may be driven by concerns with the increasing costs of litigation in the federal system.
A. The Court's Recent Decisions Regarding Pleading Standards And Other Potential Limitations On Civil Claims
Contrary to the dissenting opinion and much of the early reaction to Twombly, the Court's decision did not represent a sharp break with its prior pleading jurisprudence. Rather, Twombly must be viewed as part of a broader trend in which the Court recognizes the importance of imposing real and meaningful judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage, particularly as cases become more costly and complex to litigate.
The Court itself recognized that its decision in Twombly flowed from its prior pleadings decisions. It noted, for example, that it had previously "alluded to the practical significance of the Rule 8 entitlement requirement in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo."' 9 ' Dura Pharmaceuticals was a securities case in which the Court considered the requirements for pleading loss causation. 192 As the majority observed in Twombly, the Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals had "explained that something beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim be allowed to take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value." ' 193 Indeed, the Court has been particularly active in enforcing rigorous pleading requirements in the securities context. In its recent decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 9 for example, the Court considered the appropriate standard for pleading a "strong inference of scienter" under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Under Section 211D(b)(2) of the PSLRA, plaintiffs were required to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."' 9 5 The lower federal courts had offered differing interpretations with respect to what this provision required. 196 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, held that "[i]t does not suffice that a reasonable factfinder plausibly could infer from the complaint's allegations the requisite state of mind.' ' 197 Instead, "a court ... must consider, not only inferences urged by the plaintiff,... but also competing inferences rationally drawn from the facts alleged.' 98 Moreover, it is significant that neither of these decisions were written by the overtly "conservative" members of the Court who might be expected to welcome increased scrutiny of plaintiffs' claims at the pleadings stage. Rather, we find Justices Ginsburg and Souter writing the majority opinions, making clear that the standards for assessing the pleadings must be taken seriously and that there are significant institutional concerns associated with ensuring the appropriate level of scrutiny at the pleadings stage. Viewed more broadly, the Court's decisions regarding pleading standards can be viewed as part of a trend toward restricting the cases that are allowed to be decided by the jury. The Court imposed stringent standards for scrutinizing the reliability of proffered scientific evidence in interpreted Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as charging judges with acting as "gatekeepers" responsible for ensuring that only evidence that is both reliable and relevant may be submitted to the jury. 2°5 Likewise, the Court has evidenced a trend toward interpreting statutory preemption doctrines broadly to preclude juries from second-guessing judgments made by federal regulators. The Court has heard a series of cases in which it has suggested that it would interpret the scope of federal statutory preemption broadly. Again, the Court has expressed a concern that juries are not competent to assess complicated scientific questions that are better left to expert regulators. 20 6 While the Court's case law in this area is in flux, it appears that this is another area in which the trend is toward increasing judicial gatekeeping and applying more stringent scrutiny to the claims that are allowed to proceed to trial.
B. Twombly In The Context of The Evolving Civil Litigation Landscape
The Court's decisions, including Twombly, must be viewed in the context of the rules as a whole and the underlying dynamics within the civil justice system. As the majority emphasized, judicial scrutiny of the pleading provides an important counterbalance to the broad discovery authorized under the Federal Rules. 20 7 The Federal Rules authorize wide-ranging discovery in an effort to obtain accurate results in the litigation process. The greater the discovery, the greater the likelihood that an accurate outcome will be achieved in the litigation process. Nonetheless, this accuracy comes at a cost. The greater the discovery, the greater the costsnot only monetary, but also in terms of the time spent by the parties and the court. Judicial scrutiny of the pleadings serves an important gatekeeping role in ensuring that such costs are incurred only where they are warrantedi.e., only where the plaintiff's claim is plausible and has some non-negligible [Vol. 36: 1063 [Vol. 36: , 2009 The Twombly Revolution?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW possibility of success. These concerns have only increased with the proliferation of electronic discovery.029 As records are increasingly stored in electronic media, parties in litigation increasingly are faced with the burden of preserving, searching, and producing voluminous materials during the course of the litigation-all at significant costs. 21 The unique challenges of electronic discovery have been catalogued by a variety of commentators. These challenges include the sheer volume of electronic discovery, the difficulty of retrieving relevant information while excluding irrelevant or privileged information from discovery, and the form in which electronic information is produced.
2 ' One way of addressing these concerns is through amendment of the discovery rules. One could attempt to curb the potential abuses of discovery by placing limits on the scope of discovery or other restrictions. Some might argue that this has happened to a very limited extent with respect to discovery of electronic information. 212 In December 2006, the Federal Rules were amended to take into account the unique aspects of electronic discovery. Among other things, the rules now make a distinction between "reasonably accessible" information and "inaccessible" information, making the former subject to discovery without judicial order when "relevant and non-privileged," while the latter is discoverable only upon a showing of good cause and, even then, may be subject to certain conditions or limitations.
21 3 In addition, Rule 37 now contains a provision that allows a party to avoid discovery sanctions "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances" where it has lost electronic information due to the routine operation of its computer systems (as opposed to some purposeful effort to frustrate discovery). 4 Rule 34 allows a party to specify the form in which electronic information shall be produced; absent specification, it shall be produced as it is "ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form or forms.
, 2 5 The rules also encourage the parties to meet and confer at the outset of discovery regarding a number of topics, including the preservation of electronic information, the form in which electronic information shall be produced, and procedures for preventing the inadvertent disclosure of privileged information. 2 16 Finally, if the parties are unable to agree on procedures regarding the inadvertent production of privileged materials, Rule 26(b)(5)(B) provides default rules that allow a party to notify its opponent that certain produced information is privileged, require the opposing party to return such information or destroy it, and refrain from further disclosure of the information until the court resolves the privilege claim. 21 7 As the Advisory Committee notes observe, such provisions were particularly critical given that, "[w]hen the review is of electronically stored information, the risk of waiver, and the time and effort required to avoid it, can increase substantially because of the volume of electronically stored information and the difficulty in ensuring that all information to be produced has in fact been reviewed. obtained from other, more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties' resources. They further note that "[t]he decision whether to require a responding party to search for and produce information that is not reasonably accessible depends not only on the burdens and costs of doing so, but also on whether those burdens and costs can be justified in the circumstances of the case." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendment. 214. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) ("Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system."). But see Rosenthal, supra note 212, at 190 (arguing that there may be "increased sanctions motions" under the new rules because "judges seeking effective control over electronic discovery may impose unrealistically stringent demands on litigants and lawyers, which will predictably lead to an increase in sanctions motions if parties cannot meet the demands").
215. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b). 216. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0(3)-(4). The Advisory Committee notes observe that "[t]he particular issues regarding electronically stored information that deserve attention during the discovery planning stage depend on the specifics of the given case." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)-(4) advisory committee's note. The rules also encourage courts to address "disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information" at the Rule 16 pre-trial conference. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3). This provision "is designed to alert the court to the possible need to address the handling of discovery of electronically stored information early in the litigation if such discovery is expected to occur." FED. These provisions provide some protection for a party faced with massive discovery; nonetheless they do not go particularly far. The Federal Rules still provide for wide-ranging discovery even in the context of electronic information.
21 9 The costs of such discovery are well-documented and will only increase over time. 220 Thus, this mechanism has not provided a means for checking the potential costs of discovery. Nor, as the Twombly majority observed, is it necessarily the most effective mechanism. 221 Frequently, judges simply are not in a position to impose real limitations on discovery given their limited resources and knowledge regarding the substantive aspects of the litigation. 222 Accordingly, it is not clear that such amendments can provide an effective check on discovery abuse. Finally, one could debate whether restricting discovery is the most appropriate mechanism for balancing the costs and benefits of litigation. Arguably, judicial scrutiny of the pleadings followed by discovery for those claims that survive this threshold stage in the litigation is superior. 223 Across-the-board restrictions on discovery will apply to both those claims that have merit and those that do not. In contrast, strengthening pleading standards will target those claims with little or no merit while not disadvantaging those with merit. Utilizing limits on discovery as a means of controlling litigation costs may unduly disadvantage plaintiffs with meritorious claims.
V. CRITICISMS OF THE PLAUSIBILITY STANDARD
Viewed within this framework, many of the criticisms of the majority's decision in Twombly fall by the wayside. The Court's decision is fully consistent with the text of the rules as well as their underlying rationale. As such, it articulates a standard that is neither "vague" nor "confusing,,' 22 4 nor a "startling" deviation from existing precedent. 225 Rather, Twombly is part of a broader trend that recognizes the important role of the judge as gatekeeper.
First, the plausibility standard does not represent a deviation from traditional notice pleading. 226 As noted above, the plausibility standard properly understood is a necessary component of the notice requirement. 227 There cannot be notice without the logical coherence enforced under the plausibility rule. Accordingly, Twombly does not represent a deviation from traditional principles of notice pleading properly construed. This conclusion does not undermine the significance of the Court's decision, however. The Court essentially ratified a trend in the lower federal courts to increase the scrutiny applied to the pleadings. 228 By doing so, it sought to ensure that judges act as vigorous gatekeepers. Moreover, the scrutiny Twombly requires is mandated by the Federal Rules. While the notice pleading standard has been characterized as "liberal," 22 9 it is not so liberal that it would allow pleadings that are riddled with logical flaws or gaps to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Second, the plausibility standard does not overturn settled precedent. 23°T o the contrary, it is in line with the Court's recent approach to pleading standards. To the extent the Court purported to "overrule" precedent at all, it merely overruled a heavily criticized and poorly worded formulation of the Rule 8(a) standard in Conley. 231 In doing so, however, the Court was merely enforcing the directive in the Federal Rules and ratifying the reality within the federal courts, which had eschewed the hyper-literal reading of the Third, the plausibility standard is consistent with the Federal Rules as construed as a whole. 233 The majority correctly stated that its formulation did not impose a "heightened" pleading standard.
3 Accordingly, it did not undermine Rule 9's requirement of additional specificity in certain categories of cases, nor other provisions of the Federal Rules designed to address the problem of a lack of specificity in the pleadings, such as Rule 12(e). 235 Rather, viewed in context, the Twombly decision merely reinforces the importance of the Rule 8(a) pleading standard as the gateway to further proceedings under the generous discovery provisions of the Federal Rules. One of the (but not the only) counterweights to liberal discovery under the Federal Rules is stringent judicial scrutiny at the pleadings stage. 6 Accordingly, the Twombly ruling is supported by the structure of the Federal Rules when considered as a whole.
Finally, the plausibility standard does not represent the triumph of policy considerations over the text of the rules. 23 7 The majority properly stated that the plausibility standard flowed from the text of Rule 8.23 It is supported not only by the rule's requirement of a "showing" but also fair "notice" to the opposing parties. 239 As such, it is not merely a policy-based standard. Nonetheless, it does advance important policies that underlie the Federal Rules.
VI. CONCLUSION The full scope and effect of Twombly has yet to play out in the courts. Nonetheless, faithful adherence to the Court's decision would have potentially sweeping effects. The Court has made clear that federal courts must scrutinize complaints to ensure that they are not conclusory and that they allege facts that, if taken as true, are necessary and sufficient to establish plaintiffs' claims. 240 Likewise, it has made clear that this scrutiny is required under the plain language of Rule 8(a).
1
The proposed limitations on the Twombly decision simply lack support. While judicial scrutiny at the pleading stage may be particularly warranted in antitrust and other complex cases, which threaten to impose significant discovery costs on defendants, there is simply no basis in either the Court's decision or the plain language of the rules for such case-specific limitations. The Federal Rules apply equally to all cases and do not purport to make such distinctions. Moreover, the Court's analysis was based primarily not on such policy considerations, but its interpretation of the plain meaning of the language of Rule 8.242 Accordingly, faithful adherence to the Twombly decision will have potentially wide-ranging effects.
Nonetheless, one cannot discount the important policy implications of Twombly or its place in the broader context of modem civil litigation. Decisions such as Daubert and Twombly, which mandate greater judicial involvement in assessing the merits of plaintiffs' claims at early stages of the litigation are increasingly important in our modem civil justice system. Given the exploding costs of civil litigation and expanding discovery obligations, the risk that settlements may be based not on the merits of a particular case, but rather the in terrorem value of a lawsuit, has only increased.
2 43 Thus, the Court has correctly observed in a variety of contexts that increasing judicial scrutiny is likely to have important and beneficial offsetting effects with respect to other trends in modem civil litigation.
2 " This is not to say that these trends are necessarily undesirable. Increased discovery may lead to more accurate and just outcomes in certain circumstances as parties are able to obtain the facts necessary to fully prove their claims. Nonetheless, one cannot discount the costs associated with such developments and the need for some checks and balances to offset potential abuses. Accordingly, Twombly represents an important structural development under the Federal Rules, which is likely to improve adjudicative outcomes. 
